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INTRODUCTION

0

VER many decades, the United States has been conducting
an extraordinary natural experiment with respect to the performance of federal judges. The experiment involves the relationship between political ideology' and judicial decisions. Many people believe that political ideology should not and generally does
not affect legal judgments, and this belief contains some truth.3
Frequently the law is clear, and judges should and will simply implement it, whatever their political commitments. But what happens when the law is unclear? What role does ideology play then?
We can easily imagine two quite different positions. It might be
predicted that even when the law is unclear, ideology does not matter; the legal culture imposes a discipline on judges, so that judges
vote as judges, rather than as ideologues. Or it might be predicted
that in hard cases, the judges' "attitudes" end up predicting their
'In using this term, we do not intend to venture anything especially controversial
about the actual or appropriate grounds of judicial decisions. As will be clear, we
measure "ideology" by the political affiliation of the appointing president.
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6
(Magazine), at 38 (emphasizing that appellate court judges are required to apply
United States Supreme Court precedents through reasoned argument).
'See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal. L. Rev.
1457, 1514 (2003) (reporting empirical finding that law strongly disciplines judicial
judgments).
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votes, so that liberal judges show systematically different votes
from those of conservative judges.'
It is extremely difficult to investigate these questions directly. It
is possible, however, to identify a proxy for political ideology: the
political affiliation of the appointing president. Presidents are frequently interested in ensuring that judicial appointees are of a certain stripe. A Democratic president is unlikely to want to appoint
judges who will seek to overrule Roe v. Wade5 and strike down affirmative action programs. A Republican president is unlikely to
want to appoint judges who will interpret the Constitution to require states to recognize same-sex marriages. It is reasonable to
hypothesize that as a statistical regularity, judges appointed by Republican presidents (hereinafter described, for ease of exposition,
as Republican appointees) will be more conservative than judges
appointed by Democratic presidents (Democratic appointees, as
we shall henceforth call them). But is this hypothesis true? When is
it true, and to what degree is it true?
More subtly, we might speculate that federal judges are subject
to "panel effects"-that on a three-judge panel, a judge's likely
vote is influenced by the other two judges assigned to the same
panel. In particular, does a judge vote differently depending on
whether she is sitting with zero, one, or two judges appointed by a
president of the same political party? On one view, a Republican
appointee, sitting with two Democratic appointees, should be more
likely to vote as Democratic appointees typically do, whereas a
Democratic appointee, sitting with two Republican appointees,
should be more likely to vote as Republican appointees typically
do. But is this in fact the usual pattern? Is it an invariable one?
Since judges in a given circuit are assigned to panels (and, therefore, to cases) randomly, the existence of a large data set allows
these issues to be investigated empirically.6

'See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal
Model Revisited (2002). For an important study of politics and lower courts, see
Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians, Political Activists and the Lower Federal
Court Appointment Process (forthcoming 2004) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'For accounts of aggregate data, see Cross, supra note 3, at 1504-09 (showing significant effect of ideology, varying across administrations).
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In this Essay, we will examine a subset of possible case types, focusing on a number of controversial issues that seem especially
likely to reveal divisions between Republican and Democratic appointees. In brief, we will explore cases involving abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance, capital punishment, Commerce
Clause challenges to congressional enactments, the Contracts
Clause, criminal appeals, disability discrimination, industry challenges to environmental regulation, piercing the corporate veil,
race discrimination, sex discrimination, and claimed takings of private property without just compensation. We will offer a more detailed description of our subjects and methods below.
The central purpose of this Essay is to examine three hypotheses:
1. Ideological voting. In ideologically contested cases, a judge's
ideological tendency can be predicted by the party of the appointing president; Republican appointees vote very differently
from Democratic appointees. Ideologically contested cases involve many of the issues just mentioned, such as affirmative action, campaign finance, federalism, the rights of criminal defendants, sex discrimination, piercing the corporate veil, racial
discrimination, property rights, capital punishment, disability discrimination, sexual harassment, and abortion.
2. Ideologicaldampening. A judge's ideological tendency, in such
cases, is likely to be dampened if she is sitting with two judges of
a different political party. For example, a Democratic appointee
should be less likely to vote in a stereotypically liberal fashion if
accompanied by two Republican appointees, and a Republican
appointee should be less likely to vote in a stereotypically conservative fashion7 if accompanied by two Democratic appointees.
3. Ideological amplification. A judge's ideological tendency, in
such cases, is likely to be amplified if she is sitting with two
judges from the same political party. A Democratic appointee

'We use the phrases "stereotypically liberal" and "stereotypically conservative"
throughout for the purpose of simplicity. Of course it would be foolish to predict that
Republican appointees will always vote against sex discrimination plaintiffs or in favor of challenges to affirmative action programs.
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should show an increased tendency to vote in a stereotypically
liberal fashion if accompanied by two Democratic appointees,
and a Republican appointee should be more likely to vote in a
stereotypically conservative fashion if accompanied by two Republican appointees.
We find that in numerous areas of the law, all three hypotheses
are strongly confirmed.8 Each finds support in federal cases involving campaign finance, affirmative action, sex discrimination, sexual
harassment, piercing the corporate veil, racial discrimination, disability discrimination, Contracts Clause violations, and review of
environmental regulations. In such cases, our aggregate data
strongly confirm all three hypotheses. Indeed, we find many extreme cases of ideological dampening, which we might call "leveling effects," in which party differences are wiped out by the influence of panel composition. With leveling effects, Democratic
appointees, when sitting with two Republican appointees, are as
likely to vote in the stereotypically conservative fashion as are Republican appointees when sitting with two Democratic appointees.
We also find strong amplification effects, such that if the data set in
the relevant cases is taken as a whole, Democratic appointees, sitting with two Democratic appointees, are about twice as likely to
vote in the stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican appointees, sitting with two Republican appointees-a far larger disparity than the disparity between Democratic and Republican
votes when either is sitting with one Democratic appointee and one
Republican appointee.
In most of the areas investigated here, the political party of the
appointing president is a fairly good predictor of how individual
judges will vote. But in those same areas, the political party of the
president who appointed the other two judges on the panel is at
least as good a predictor of how individual judges will vote. All in

8 See

also Cross, supra note 3, at 1504-05 (describing similar findings based on ag-

gregate data). For a valuable study of peer influences within the judiciary in affirmative action cases, see Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 1971-1999 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.yale.edu/
coic/CameronCummings.pdf.
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all, Democratic appointees show somewhat greater susceptibility to
panel effects than do Republican appointees.
But there are noteworthy counterexamples to our general findings. In three important areas, ideology does not predict judicial
votes, and hence all three hypotheses are refuted. This is the pattern in criminal appeals, takings claims, and Commerce Clause
challenges to congressional enactments. In two other areas, the
first hypothesis is supported, but the second and third hypotheses
are refuted. These two areas are abortion and capital punishment.
In each of these areas, judges apparently vote their convictions and
are not affected by panel composition.
We offer a number of other findings. We show that variations in
panel composition lead to dramatically different outcomes, in a
way that creates serious problems for the rule of law. In the cases
we analyze, a panel composed of three Democratic appointees issues a liberal ruling 61% of the time, whereas a panel composed of
three Republican appointees issues a liberal ruling only 34% of the
time. A panel composed of two Republican appointees and one
Democrat issues a liberal ruling 39% of the time; a panel composed of two Democratic appointees and one Republican does so
50% of the time. These differences certainly do not show that the
likely result is foreordained by the composition of the panel; there
is a substantial overlap between the votes of Republican appointees and those of Democratic appointees. Ideology is hardly everything. But the litigant's chances, in the cases we examine, are significantly affected by the luck of the draw.
To understand the importance of group dynamics on judicial
panels, it is important to emphasize that a Democratic majority, or
a Republican majority, has enough votes to do what it wishes. Apparently a large disciplining effect comes from the presence of a
single panelist from another party. Hence all-Republican panels
show far more conservative patterns than majority Republican
panels, and all-Democratic panels show far more liberal patterns
than majority Democratic panels.
Our tale is largely one of effects from ideology on individual voting and panel outcomes. But it is important not to overstate those
effects. The pool of cases studied here is limited to domains where
ideology would be expected to play a large role. Outside of such
domains, Republican and Democratic appointees are far less likely
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to differ. The absence of party effects in important and contested
areas (criminal law, takings, and federalism) testifies to the possibility of commonalities across partisan lines, even when differences
might be expected. And even where party differences are statistically significant, they are not huge. In the entire sample, Democratic appointees issue a liberal vote 51% of the time, whereas Republicans do so 38% of the time. The full story emphasizes the
significant effects of ideology and also the limited nature of those
effects. We shall spend considerable time on the complexities here.
Disaggregating our data, we provide evidence of how ideology
varies by circuit, showing that the Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits are the most liberal, while the Fifth and Seventh are the most
conservative. We also find striking similarities across circuits. In all
circuits, Democratic appointees are more likely than Republican
appointees to vote in a stereotypically liberal direction. At the
same time, however, a judge's vote is no better predicted by his or
her own party than it is by the party of the other two judges on the
panel.
Our main goal in this Essay is simply to present and analyze the
data-to show the extent to which the three hypotheses find vindication But we also aim to give some explanation for our findings
and to relate them to some continuing debates about the role of
ideology on federal panels. Our data do not reveal whether ideological dampening is a product of persuasion or a form of collegiality. If Republican appointees show a liberal pattern of votes when
accompanied by two Democratic appointees, it might be because
they are convinced by their colleagues. Alternatively, they might
suppress their private doubts and accept the majority's view. It is
also possible that they are able to affect the reasoning in the majority opinion, trading their vote for a more moderate statement of
the law. In any case, it is reasonable to say that the data show the
pervasiveness of the "collegial concurrence": a concurrence by a
judge who signs the panel's opinion either because he is persuaded
by the shared opinion of the two other judges on the panel or because it is not worthwhile, all things considered, to dissent. The collegial concurrence can be taken as an example, in the unlikely set'Some of the findings here are previewed, without statistical analysis, in Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, at ch. 8 (2003).
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ting of judicial panels, of responsiveness to conformity pressures.'"
These pressures make it more likely that people will end up silencing themselves, or even publicly agreeing with a majority position,
simply because they would otherwise be isolated in their disagreement. We will discuss these issues at greater length after presenting
the data.
We also find evidence within the federal judiciary of "group polarization," by which like-minded people move toward a more extreme position in the same direction as their predeliberation
views." If all-Republican panels are overwhelmingly likely to strike
down campaign finance regulation, and if all-Democratic panels
are overwhelmingly likely to uphold affirmative action programs,
group polarization is likely to be a reason. Finally, we offer indirect
evidence of a "whistleblower effect": A single judge of another
party, while likely to be affected by the fact that he is isolated,
might also influence other judges on the panel, at least where the
panel would otherwise fail to follow existing law."
We believe that our findings are of considerable interest in
themselves. They also reveal much about human behavior in many
contexts. A great deal of social science evidence shows conformity
effects: When people are confronted with the views of unanimous
others, they tend to yield.'3 Sometimes they yield because they believe that unanimous others cannot be wrong; sometimes they yield
because it is not worthwhile to dissent in public." In addition, a
great deal of social science evidence shows that like-minded people

"'For an overview of conformity pressures, see Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1984).
"See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (1985); Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 112-13; David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139, 1140 (2000); see also
Cameron & Cummings, supra note 8, at 19-21 (discussing a similar finding in affirmative action cases, to the effect that liberal judges become far less inclined to uphold
affirmative action programs when surrounded by conservatives, and that conservative
judges become far more approving when surrounded by liberals).
2 See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155
(1998).
13 See Asch, supra note
10.
'4 See Robert Baron et al., Group Process, Group Decision, Group Action 66
(1992).
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tend to go to extremes. 5 In the real world, this hypothesis is extremely hard to test in light of the range of confounding variables.
But our data provide strong evidence that like-minded judges also
go to extremes: The probability that a judge will vote in one or another direction is increased by the presence of judges appointed by
the president of the same political party. In short, we claim to show
both strong conformity effects and group polarization within federal courts of appeals. If these effects can be shown there, then
they are also likely to be found in many other diverse contexts.
In fact, the presence of such effects raises doubts about what is
probably the most influential method for explaining judicial voting:
the "attitudinal model."' 6 According to the attitudinal model,
judges have certain "attitudes" toward areas of the law, and these
attitudes are good predictors of judicial votes in difficult cases." Insofar as party effects are present, our findings are broadly supportive of this idea. But the attitudinal model does not come to terms
with panel effects, which can both dampen and amplify the tendencies to which judicial "attitudes" give rise. Since panel effects are
generally as large as party effects, and sometimes even larger, the
attitudinal model misses a crucial factor behind judicial votes.
A disclaimer: We have collected a great deal of data, but our subtitle-a preliminary investigation-should be taken very seriously. The
federal reporters offer an astonishingly large data set for judicial
votes, including over two hundred years of votes ranging over countless substantive areas. Our own investigation is limited to several areas that, by general agreement, are ideologically contested, enough to
produce possible disagreements in the cases that find their way to the
courts of appeals.18 Of course it would be extremely interesting to
"Brown, supra note 11, at 203-26.
See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 4.
See id. at 86. We oversimplify a complex account.
Note that the disciplining effect of existing law will be most constraining in disputes that never find their way to litigation; in many such cases, everyone agrees what
the law is, and it is not worthwhile to test that question. In disputes that are not litigated, it is safe to say that Republican appointees and Democratic appointees would
agree almost all of the time. The doctrine should be expected to impose less discipline
in cases that go to trial. In addition, the decision to appeal suggests a degree of indeterminacy in the law. Hence we are considering cases that are not only contested ideologically, but that also involve a sufficient lack of clarity in the law as to make it
worthwhile to challenge a lower court ruling. Of course, the highest degree of indeterminacy can be found in cases that are litigated to the Supreme Court. In the areas
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know much more.19 Might ideological voting and panel effects be
found in apparently nonideological cases involving, for example,
bankruptcy, torts, and civil procedure? What about the important areas of antitrust and labor law? How do the three hypotheses fare in
the early part of the twentieth century, when federal courts were confronting the regulatory state for the first time? In cases involving
minimum wage and maximum hour laws, did Republican appointees
differ from Democratic appointees, and were panel effects also significant? Do the hypotheses hold in the segregation cases of the 1960s
and 1970s? In the future, it should be possible to use the techniques
discussed here to test a wide range of hypotheses about judicial voting
patterns. One of our central goals is to provide a method for future
analysis, a method that can be used in countless contexts.
This Essay will be organized as follows. Part I will offer the basic
data, testing the three hypotheses in a number of areas. Part II will
disaggregate the data by exploring circuit results. Part III will speculate about the reasons for the various findings, with special attention
to collegial concurrences, group polarization, and whistleblower effects. Part IV will investigate some normative issues.
in which we find no effects from ideology--criminal appeals, takings, and federalism-such effects may nonetheless be found at the Supreme Court level.
9 For a valuable discussion, see Cross, supra note 3, which involves aggregate data
and does not explore particularly controversial areas, and thus provides a useful supplement to ours. We are now embarking on a more extensive study, with data and
analysis available at Chicago Judges Project, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
policy/judges (2004). The effect of judicial ideology is usefully investigated in Linda
R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 65 (Spring 1994) (special issue) (finding that justices are far more likely to defer to an agency's statutory construction when the agency is controlled by a president
of the same political party as the justice). There is an informative but sparse literature
on panel effects. See Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards
Conformity in a Three Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 Soc. Sci. Q. 41 (1973); Burton M. Atkins & Justin J.
Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 735 (1976); Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 461; Donald R. Songer, Consensual and
Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 225 (1982). We have found especially valuable Cross &
Tiller, supra note 12, and Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology,
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997). On partisan voting, see David E.
Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals (2002); Donald R. Songer
et al., Continuity and Change on the United States Courts of Appeals (2000); Revesz,
supra. A helpful overview of party effects is Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-analysis, 20 Just. Sys. J. 219 (1999).
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I. THE THREE HYPOTHESES

A. Aggregate Data
We examined a total of 4958 published majority three-judge
panel decisions, and the 14,874 associated individual judge's votes,"
in areas involving abortion,2' capital punishment,22 the Americans
with Disabilities Act,' criminal appeals,2" takings,25 the Contracts
21With regard to search criteria, we tried to choose the method that would achieve the

highest number of results. Once we performed the searches as listed, we further filtered
the body of cases so as to include only those that were relevant. For example, in the capital
punishment context, when we searched for "capital punishment" on Lexis, we found relevant cases as well as irrelevant ones. Irrelevant cases would include, for instance, a noncapital punishment case citing a capital punishment case. See, e.g., Hines v. United States,
282 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing a capital punishment case and including the
words "capital punishment" in citation even though Hines was a non-capital punishment
case). In the affirmative action context, some irrelevant cases noted that "Congress has not
taken an affirmative action." Since these cases did not bear on what we were studying,
they were not included in the final search results.
2 We assembled the sample of abortion cases by searching Lexis for "core-terms (abortion) and date aft 1982 and constitutional" and "abortion and constitution!". These cases
generally presented challenges to statutes and policies that might infringe on a woman's
right to choose, or challenges to the constitutionality of antiprotesting injunctions. (We
included the latter set of cases both because they are plausibly seen as "abortion cases"
and because their inclusion increases the size of a fairly small sample. It would be possible
to object that these cases are properly treated as "free speech cases" rather than "abortion
cases," but we hypothesized that the abortion issue would inevitably be salient, a hypothesis that is supported by our findings about judicial voting patterns.) Because plaintiffs differed between the cases, outcomes were coded as pro-life or pro-choice; if a judge voted at
all to support the pro-life position then the vote was counted as a pro-life vote. The sample
includes cases from 01/01/82-12/31/02. We identified a total of 101 cases.
22We assembled this sample of capital punishment cases by searching Lexis for "capital
punishment." If a judge voted to grant the defendant any relief, then the vote was coded as
a pro-defendant vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/95-12/31/02. We identified a
total of 181 cases.
23
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). We assembled this sample of disability cases by
searching Lexis for "Americans with Disabilities Act." If a judge voted to grant the plaintiff any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases
from 01/01/98-12/31/02. We identified a total of 682 cases.
21We assembled the sample of criminal cases from the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit, and
the Fourth Circuit by searching httpJ/www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/cadc.cfm,
http://vls.law.vill.edu/Locator/3/, and http://www.law.emory.edu/4circuit/2nd-idx.html for
cases with "United States" in the title. Government appeals and civil disputes were disregarded. If a judge voted to grant the defendant any relief, then the vote was coded as a prodefendant vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/95-12/31/02. We identified a total of
1176 cases.
25We assembled the sample of takings cases by Shepardizing on Lexis Lucas
v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal

HeinOnline -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 311 2004

312

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 90:301

Clause, 26 affirmative action, 27 Title VII race discrimination cases
brought by African-American plaintiffs,28 sex discrimination,29
campaign finance,3" sexual harassment,31 cases in which plaintiffs
sought to pierce the corporate veil,32 industry challenges to envi-

Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (1987); and Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978). If a judge voted to grant the party alleging a violation of the Takings
Clause any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes
cases from 06/26/78-12/31/02. We identified a total of 215 cases. We did not include
decisions of the U.S. Court of Claims, as discussed infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
" We assembled the sample of Contracts Clause cases by Shepardizing on Lexis Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,438 U.S. 234 (1978), and U.S. Trust Co. of New
York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). If a judge voted to grant the party alleging a
violation of the Contracts Clause any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff
vote. The sample includes cases from 04/2777-12/31/02. We identified a total of seventy-six cases.
27We assembled the sample of affirmative action cases by searching Lexis for "affirmative action and constitution or constitutional." The sample also includes cases
found through a Westlaw Key Cite of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIOCLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Regents of University of Californiav. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978). If a judge voted to hold any part of an affirmative action plan unconstitutional, then the vote was considered a vote for the party challenging the plan.
The sample includes cases from 06/28/78-12/31/02. We identified a total of 155 cases.
28We assembled the sample of Title VII cases by searching Lexis for "Title VII and
African-American or black." We included cases that presented a challenge by an African-American plaintiff. If a judge voted to grant the plaintiff any relief, then the
vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/8512/31/02. We identified a total of 320 cases.
21We assembled the sample of sex discrimination cases by searching Lexis for
"sex!
discrimination or sex! harassment." If the plaintiff was afforded any relief, then the
vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/9512/31/02. We identified a total of 1007 cases.
'oWe assembled the sample of campaign finance cases by Shepardizing on Lexis
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). If a judge voted to afford the party challenging
the campaign finance provision any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff
vote. The sample includes cases from 01/30/76-12/31/02. We identified a total of fiftyfive cases.
31We assembled the sample of sexual harassment cases (a subset of sex discrimination cases) by searching Lexis for "sex! harassment." If a judge voted to afford the
plaintiff any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/95-12/31/02. We identified a total of 470 cases.
32 We assembled the sample of piercing the corporate veil cases by searching Lexis
for "pierc! and corporate veil." If a judge voted to afford the plaintiff trying to pierce
the veil any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from 01/01/95-12/31/02. We identified a total of 106 cases.
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ronmental regulations, 33 and federalism challenges tb congressional
enactments under the Commerce Clause. 4 Our methods for finding
and assessing these cases, described in the footnotes, leave room
for errors and for a degree of discretion. We are confident, however, that the basic pattern of our results is sound. To keep the inquiry manageable, our investigation is limited to recent time periods (sometimes from 1995 to the present, though sometimes
longer, certainly when necessary to produce a sufficient number of
cases in a particular category35 ). We believe that limited though the
evidence is, our results are sufficient to show the range of likely
patterns and also to establish the claim that the three principal hypotheses are often vindicated.
Our sample is limited to published opinions. This limitation obviously simplifies research, but it also follows from our basic goal,
which is to test the role of ideology in difficult cases rather than
easy ones. As a general rule, unpublished opinions are widely
agreed to be simple and straightforward and to involve no difficult
or complex issues of law. To be sure, publication practices are not
uniform across circuits, and hence the decision to focus on published cases complicates cross-circuit comparisons. But that decision enables us to test our hypotheses in the cases that most interest us (and the public), while also producing at least considerable
information about the role of party and panel effects across circuits.36
3 We assembled the sample of EPA cases by searching http://www.ll.
georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/cadc.cfm for cases with "EPA" or the EPA administrator's name in the case title. We crosschecked this set of cases with results from a
Lexis search of "EPA" and "Environmental Protection Agency." If a judge voted to
afford the industry challenger any relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-industry
vote. The sample includes cases from 09/19/94-12/31/02. For cases before 1994, we relied on Revesz, supra note 19, at 1721-27. We identified a total of 142 cases.
' We assembled the sample of Commerce Clause cases by Shepardizing on Lexis
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). If a judge voted to afford the plaintiff any
relief, then the vote was coded as a pro-plaintiff vote. The sample includes cases from
04/26/95-12/31/02. We identified a total of 272 cases.
3"Thus
we extended the viewscreen to earlier cases when the post-1995 sample was
small. In deciding how far back to look, we typically relied on starting dates marked
by important Supreme Court decisions that would predictably be cited in relevant
cases.
6 Because unpublished opinions generally involve easy cases, we would not expect
to see significant party or panel effects in them, and a full sample of court of appeals
opinions, including unpublished ones, would of course show reduced effects of both
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Table 1. Summary of Votes by Individual Judges and Majority
Decisions of Three-Judge Panels
(proportion voting for the liberal position on the given issue)
Individual Judges' Votes

Panel Majority Decisions

Panel Colleagues
RD

DD

Panel Composition
DD

RRR

RRD

RDD

DDD

RRR-

R

D

D-fR

RR

Camtpaign finance (vote to uphold)

.28

.46

.18

.29

.34

.53

.24

.23

.30

.35

.80

.57

Affirmative action (vote for)

.48

.74

.26

.47

.62

.73

.26

.37

.50

,83

.85

.48

EPA (vote against industry)

.46

.64

.18

.48

.54

.66

.19

.27

.55

.62

.72

.45

Sex discrimination (voto for Plaintfl)

.35

.51

.16

.36

.41

.57

.21

.31

.38

.49

.75

.44

Contacts (rejectconst challenge)

.24

.30

.06

.19

.26

.45

.26

.16

.26

.32

.50

.34

Pierce corp veil (vote to pierce)

.27

.41

.14

.25

.31

.51

.26

.23

.29

.37

.56

.33

ADA (vote for Plaintiff)

.26

.43

.17

.24

.35

.45

.21

.18

.27

47

.50

.32

Abortion (vote pro-choice)

.49

.70

.21

.58

.55

.65

.07

.53

.51

.62

.78

.25

Capital punishment (vote against)

.20

.42

.22

.29

.29

.30

.01

.18

.22

.38

.33

.15

Title VH cases(vote for Plaintiff)

.35

.41

.06

.39

.35

.42

.04

.43

.31

.45

.56

.13

Federalism(vote to uphold)

.95

.99

.04

.96

.97

.97

.01

.97

1.00

.98

1.00

.03

Criminal (vote for Defendant)

.33

.36

.03

.33

.33

.33

.00

.31

.31

.40

.34

.02

Takings clause (find no taking)

.23

.20

-.03

.23

.20

.23

.00

.26

.17

.24

.25

-.01

Average across all Case types

.38

.51

.13

.39

.43

.52

.14

.34

.39

.50

.61

.27

.34

.50

.16

.35

.40

.53

.17

.29

.36

.49

.64

.35

Case Type

Case typeswith a panel difference

Table 1 shows the percentage of stereotypically liberal votes 37 in
a variety of areas. It reveals both individual votes and majority decisions of three-judge panels. Note first that in a number of areas,
there is strong evidence of ideological voting in the sense that Democratic appointees are more likely to vote in the stereotypically
liberal direction than are Republican appointees. We measure
ideological voting by subtracting the percentage of liberal Republican votes from the percentage of liberal Democratic votes; the lar-

party and ideology. We emphasize that our goal is to see those effects in the hard
cases, not the easy ones, and hence their absence from easy cases is essentially uninteresting.
" For simplicity of analysis and clarity of presentation, we coded votes for all case
types in the same ideological direction. Identical results would come using conservative votes but with the sign reversed.
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ger the number, the larger the party effect. The overall difference
is 13%-not huge, but substantial. The extent of this effect, and
even its existence, is variable across areas. We shall discuss these
variations shortly.
We can also see that the votes of judges are influenced by the
party affiliation of the other two judges on the same panel.38 As a
first approximation, we measure this influence by subtracting the
overall percentage of liberal votes by a judge of either party when
sitting with two Democratic appointees from the percentage when
he or she sits with two Republican appointees. Surprisingly, this
overall difference, 14%, is as large as the basic difference between
parties. This is our simple measure of panel effects, though it is
part of a more complex story. As we shall see, there are multiple
ways to assess the influence of the other judges on the panel.
Finally, it is clear that these two influences result in actual decisions that are very much affected by the composition of the panel.
The clearest point is a sharp spread between the average outcome
in an all-Republican panel and that in an all-Democratic panel. Indeed, the likelihood of a liberal outcome is roughly twice as high
with the latter as with the former. For litigants in highly controversial areas, a great deal depends on the luck of the draw-the outcome of a random assignment of judges.

In the same vein, see Cross, supra note 3, at 1504-05.
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Figure 1. Party and Panel Influences on Votes of Individual
Judges

(on average for ideological case types)
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Figure 1 captures the aggregate party and panel effects across
those areas in which there is ideological voting.3 9 The most striking
lessons of this figure are our principal themes here.' For both De-

31We exempt cases in which there is little or no ideological voting (criminal cases,
takings cases, and federalism cases). If those cases were included, then we would see
the same overall patterns, but in diminished form. If we exempt cases of ideological
voting without panel effects (abortion, capital punishment), the aggregate panel effects would of course be more pronounced.
" The data were analyzed using a logistic regression model with the vote (liberal/conservative) of an individual judge in a given case as the dependent variable.
The independent variables were the judge's party (Democratic/Republican appointee), the number of Democratic appointees among the other two judges on the
panel, and dummy variables for case category and circuit. Results for this overall
model appear in the Appendix. For analyses of individual case categories, the model
is the same but with case category dummies dropped; for analyses of circuits, the circuit dummies are dropped. In the aggregate analysis of Figure 1 the coefficients for
party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both highly significant. There is also a slight
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mocratic appointees and Republican appointees, the likelihood of
a liberal vote jumps when the two other panel members are Democratic appointees, and it drops when the two other panel members are Republican appointees. For purposes of discussion, we
might take, as the baseline, cases in which a judge is sitting with
one Democrat and one Republican, and compare how voting patterns shift when a judge is sitting instead with two Democratic appointees or two Republican appointees. We can readily see that a
Democrat, in the baseline condition, casts a liberal vote 51% of the
time, whereas a Republican does so 35% of the time. Sitting with
two Democratic appointees, Democratic appointees cast liberal
votes 63% of the time, whereas Republican appointees do so 44%
of the time. Sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic
appointees cast liberal votes 45% of the time, whereas Republican
appointees do so only 30% of the time. Thus, Republican appointees sitting with two Democratic appointees show the same basic
pattern of votes as do Democratic appointees sitting with two Republican appointees.
The aggregate figures conceal some significant differences across
case categories. We begin with cases in which all three hypotheses
are supported and then turn to cases in which they are not.

tendency for Democratic appointees to show larger panel effects than Republican appointees (the interaction term is marginally significant, p < .07).
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B. All Hypotheses Supported
Figure 2. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Both Party and
Panel Effects
(M (black) = Republican appointees, 0 (white) = Democratic appointees)
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1. Affirmative Action

Let us start with affirmative action, which shows the basic pattern of results as in the aggregate data (Figure 2). 4' From 1978

through 2002, Republican appointees cast 267 total votes, with 127,
or 48%, in favor of upholding an affirmative action policy. By contrast, Democratic appointees cast 198 votes, with 147, or 74%, in
favor of upholding an affirmative action policy. Here we find striking evidence of ideological voting. We also find significant evidence of panel effects. An isolated Democrat sitting with two Republican appointees votes for affirmative action only 61% of the
time-halfway between the aggregate numbers for Democratic appointees and Republican appointees. More remarkably, isolated
Democratic appointees are actually slightly less likely to vote for
affirmative action programs than are isolated Republican appointees, who vote in favor 65% of the time. Thus, we see strong evidence of ideological dampening.
The third hypothesis is also confirmed. On all-Republican panels, individual Republican appointees vote for affirmative action
programs only 37% of the time-but 49% of the time when Republican appointees hold a two-to-one majority. On allDemocratic panels, individual Democratic appointees vote in favor
of the plan 82% of the time, compared to 80% with a two-judge
Democratic majority. An institution defending an affirmative action program has about a one-in-three chance of success before an
all-Republican panel-but more than a four-in-five chance before
an all-Democratic panel! In a pattern that pervades many of the
doctrinal areas, the rate of pro-affirmative action votes on allDemocratic panels is almost triple the corresponding rate of Republican votes on all-Republican panels.
2. Sex Discrimination
In sex discrimination cases from 1995 to the present, Republican
appointees voted in favor of plaintiffs 35% of the time, whereas
Democratic appointees voted for plaintiffs 51% of the time. Hence
we find strong evidence of ideological voting, though not as strong
"' The coefficients for party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both significant. For
related findings about overlapping data, with more refined coding, see Cameron &
Cummings, supra note 8.
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as in the affirmative action context. 2 When in the minority, Republican appointees vote in favor of sex discrimination plaintiffs 42%
of the time, identical to the 42% rate of Democratic appointees
when they are in the minority. The most striking number here is
the percentage of pro-plaintiff votes when three Democratic appointees are sitting together. Here 75% of Democratic votes favor
plaintiffs, far higher than the rates of 50% or less when Democratic
appointees sit with one or more Republican appointees. On allRepublican panels, Republican appointees vote at a strongly antiplaintiff rate, with only 31% favoring plaintiffs; this rate increases
steadily with each Democrat on a panel.
3. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment cases are a subset of sex discrimination cases;
for that reason, they have not been included as a separate entry in
our aggregate figures. But because the area is of considerable independent interest, we have conducted a separate analysis of sexual harassment cases.43 Republican appointees vote in favor of
plaintiffs at a rate of 37%, whereas Democratic appointees vote for
plaintiffs at a rate of 52%. Sitting with two Democratic appointees,
Republican appointees are more likely to vote for plaintiffs than
Democratic appointees sitting with two Republican appointees by
a margin of 44% to 41%. On all-Democratic panels, Democratic
appointees vote for plaintiffs at a 76% rate, more than double the
32% rate of Republican appointees on all-Republican panels. It
might be expected that gender would be relevant to rulings in sexual harassment cases, and for this reason we did a separate analysis
of whether gender predicts likely votes. The answer is that gender
does not matter. Female judges are not more likely than male
judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in our sample of these cases,
and judges who sit with one or more female judges are not more
likely to vote for plaintiffs than those who sit only with male
judges. The party of the appointing president, not gender, is the
important variable.

2The

coefficients for party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both significant.

The coefficients for party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both significant.
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4. Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, judges of both parties are influenced by the colleagues with whom they sit on a
panel." In data collected for the period from 1998 to 2002,"5 Republican appointees vote 26% of the time in favor of plaintiffs; sitting
with one Republican and one Democrat, the rate is 25 %, about the
same as the aggregate figure. When sitting with two Republican
appointees, however, the rate drops to 18%, and when sitting with
two Democratic appointees, it jumps to 42%. Democratic percentages move in the same directions, though with a slightly different
pattern. The overall pro-plaintiff vote is 43%, but it is 32% when a
Democratic appointee sits with two Republican appointees (significantly lower than the 42% rate for Republican appointees sitting with two Democratic appointees), and it rises to 48% with one
other Democrat and to 50% on all-Democratic panels.
5. Piercing the CorporateVeil
Cases in which plaintiffs attempt to pierce the corporate veil follow a very similar pattern to sex discrimination cases, with all three
hypotheses confirmed. 6 Republican appointees accept such claims
at a significantly lower rate than Democratic appointees: 27% as
opposed to 41%. But here as elsewhere, Republicans sitting with
two Democratic appointees, voting 37% in favor of veil-piercing,
are more liberal than Democrats sitting with two Republican appointees, voting in favor of piercing only 29% of the time. The
most extreme figures in the data involve unified panels. Here, too,
the pro-plaintiff voting percentage of Democratic appointees on
all-Democratic panels is almost triple the corresponding number
for Republican appointees on all-Republican panels: 67% as opposed to 23%.
6. CampaignFinance
In cases since 1976, Republican appointees cast only 28% of
their votes in favor of upholding campaign finance laws, substan"The coefficients for party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both significant.
The sample is very large here, so we thought it unnecessary to collect earlier data
to test our three hypotheses.
,'The coefficients for party (p < .01) and panel (p < .001) are both significant.
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tially lower than the 46% rate for Democratic appointees. Hence
the first hypothesis-ideological voting-is tentatively supported. 7
With respect to the second hypothesis, involving ideological dampening, the results are suggestive as well. When sitting with two
Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote to uphold
campaign finance laws 35% of the time. When sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic appointees vote for such programs 40% of the time.
Now we turn to the third hypothesis, involving ideological amplification. On all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote to
uphold 23% of the time, while on all-Democratic panels, Democratic appointees vote to uphold 73% of the time. The corresponding numbers on two-judge majority panels are 30% and 38% respectively. Thus, there is evidence of a substantial difference
between the behavior of all-Democratic panels and Democratic
majority panels-but Republican judges tend to vote the same regardless of whether they are on unified panels or Republican majority panels.
7. EnvironmentalRegulation
A large data set, much of it compiled and explored in an important and illuminating essay by Dean Richard Revesz, 8 comes from
industry challenges to EPA regulations. We have added a great
deal to Revesz's data set here,49 though, like Revesz, we limit our
investigation to the D.C. Circuit, which hears the vast majority of
environmental cases.50 From 1970 through 2002, Democratic appointees voted against agency challenges 64% of the time, whereas
Republican appointees did so 46% of the time." There are also sig17 Here we are hampered by the small number of campaign finance
cases available.
The coefficient for party almost achieves significance (p = .13), and the panel coefficient is positive but not significantly different from zero (p = .35). We include campaign finance cases in this group of case categories because it has a similar pattern
that would be highly significant given a larger number of cases.
,' See Revesz, supra note 19.
See id. at 1721-27.
'0The coefficients for party (p < .001) and panel (p < .001) are both significant.
" Using a smaller data set than that used here, Dean Revesz finds that when industry challenges an environmental regulation, there is an extraordinary difference between the behavior of a Republican majority and that of a Democratic majority. Republican majorities reverse agencies over 50% of the time; Democratic majorities do
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nificant findings of group influence.52 Republican appointees show
ideological amplification. On all-Republican panels, Republican
appointees vote against industry challenges just 27% of the time,
but for members of two-Republican majorities this figure rises rapidly to 50%, and finally to 63% for a single minority Republican.
Interestingly, Democratic appointees do not show ideological
amplification in this domain. A single Democratic appointee accompanied by two Republican appointees votes against industry
challenges 63% of the time, but when joined by two Democratic
appointees, the rate rises only to 72%. Their invalidation votes are
largely impervious to panel effects. As Dean Revesz has shown,
however, ideological amplification can be found among Democratic appointees when an environmental group is challenging
agency action. A panel of three Democratic appointees is more
likely to accept the challenge than a panel of two Democratic appointees and one Republican. 3 The likelihood that a Democrat will
vote in favor of an environmentalist challenge is highest when
three Democratic appointees are on the panel-and lowest when
the panel has two Republican appointees.
8. Contracts Clause Violations
We examined Contracts Clause cases with the thought that Republican appointees would be more sympathetic than Democratic
appointees to Contracts Clause claims. Our speculation to this effect was rooted in the fact that conservative academics have argued
for stronger judicial protection of contractual rights through constitutional rulings. But our speculation turned out to be wrong.
There is mild evidence of ideological voting with respect to the
so less than 15% of the time. Revesz, supra note 19, at 1763; Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards,
85 Va. L. Rev. 805, 808 (1999). Ideology also emerges as an important factor in Cohen
& Spitzer, supra note 19 (finding that justices are far more likely to defer to an
agency's statutory construction when the agency is controlled by a president of the
same political party as the justice).
52See Revesz, supra note 19, at 1751-56; Revesz, supra note 51, at 808.
'3 Revesz, supra note 19, at 1753.
Id. Revesz notes, however, that these differences are not statistically significant,
an unsurprising fact in light of the small sample. Id.
" See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 703, 704-05 (1984).
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Contracts Clause, but it runs in the opposite direction from what
we predicted, apparently because those who make Contracts
Clause objections are more sympathetic to Democratic than to Republican appointees. 6
In cases from 1977 to the present, Republican appointees vote
on behalf of plaintiffs 24% of the time, whereas Democratic appointees do so 30% of the time. More striking in this context are
the panel effects, which are large for both parties. On allDemocratic panels, Democratic appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs 50% of the time; on all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote in favor of plaintiffs only 16% of the time. Moreover,
the dampening effects are large and in the predicted direction. Sitting with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote
in favor of plaintiffs in 42% of the cases, whereas a Democrat sitting with two Republican appointees does so just 24% of the time.
9. Title VII
In cases brought under Title VII by African-American plaintiffs,
we find small but nearly statistically significant evidence of ideological voting: Democratic appointees vote for plaintiffs 41% of the
time, whereas Republican appointees do so 35% of the time. The
small size of the difference is noteworthy, and we are not entirely
sure how to explain it.57 Democratic appointees show ideological
dampening, with a 33% pro-plaintiff vote when sitting with two
Republican appointees, and ideological amplification, with a 54%
pro-plaintiff vote when sitting with two Democratic appointees.
The pattern for Republican appointees is a puzzle. When sitting
with two Republican appointees, Republican appointees actually
vote for plaintiffs at a higher rate--43%-than when sitting with
one or more Democratic appointees. When sitting with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote for plaintiffs at a
35% rate, slightly higher than the 30% rate shown when sitting
6 The

coefficient for party is not significantly different from zero (p > .30), but the

panel coefficient is significant (p < .01).
" Neither the coefficient for party (p = .18) nor that for panel (p > .30) is significantly different from zero. We include Title VII cases here because, except for the
anomalous pattern for all-Republican ("RRR") panels, the remainder of the pattern
looks similar to the rest of the groups of case categories. Indeed, if we drop the RRR
group, both party and panel effects are significant.

HeinOnline -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 324 2004

325

Ideological Voting

2004]

with one Democrat and one Republican. Overall, this pattern is
similar to others with both party and colleague effects, except for
the apparently anomalous voting of all-Republican panels, for
which we have no good explanation.
C. All Hypotheses Rebutted
In three areas, all of our hypotheses were rebutted (Figure 3).
The simple reason is that in these areas there is no significant difference between the votes of Republican appointees and those of
Democratic appointees. Contrary to expectations, the political affiliation of the appointing president does not matter in the contexts
of criminal appeals, federalism, and takings.
Figure 3. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Neither Party nor
Panel Effects
(U (black) = Republican appointees, 0 (white) = Democratic appointees)
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1. CriminalAppeals
It might be anticipated that Democratic appointees would be especially sympathetic to criminal defendants and that Republican
appointees would be relatively unsympathetic. At least this is a
popular platitude about judicial behavior. Hence the three hypotheses might be anticipated to receive strong support. But all of
them are rejected, at least in three courts of appeals from 1995 to
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the present.58 We selected the courts of appeals for the D.C. Circuit
and for the Third and Fourth Circuits on the theory that we would
be highly likely to find ideological voting in criminal cases in those
circuits. (We follow widespread but informal lore here, which suggests that ideological splits are especially severe on these circuits.)
But we found no such effects. The overall rate of votes for defendants is between 30% and 39%, with no significant differences between Republican appointees and Democratic appointees and
without significant panel effects. We conclude that Republican appointees and Democratic appointees do not much differ in this
domain; we attempt to explain this finding below.
2. Federalismand the Commerce Clause
Since 1995, the overwhelming majority of federal judicial votes
have been in favor of the constitutionality of programs challenged
under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, Democratic appointees vote
to validate the challenged program over 99% of the time! The
numbers are not materially different for Republican appointees,
for whom the overall validation rate is 95%. No panel effects are
observed. 9 A possible reason for the agreement is that for many
decades, the United States Supreme Court gave a clear signal that
courts should be reluctant to invalidate congressional enactments
under the Commerce Clause. ' To be sure, the Court has provided
important recent signs of willingness to invoke that clause against
Congress."' But neither Republican nor Democratic appointees
seem to believe that those signals should be taken very seriously.
Perhaps things will change in this regard as the lower courts internalize the Court's messages. One qualification about our findings
should be noted here: The difference between Republican and
Democratic appointees is statistically significant. But this apparent
difference is only of technical interest, since both groups of judges
vote to uphold nearly 100% of the time, and panels vote to uphold

" Neither the coefficient for party nor that for panel is significantly different from
zero.
5'The coefficient for party is significant (p <.05), but the coefficient for panel is not.
See Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law (4th ed. 2001).
61 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
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at least 97% of the time regardless of which combination of judges
sits on a panel (see Table 1).
3. Takings
When plaintiffs challenge a governmental decision as violative of
property rights, Democratic appointees and Republican appointees
again show no significant differences in voting.62 Only 23% of Republican votes are in favor of such challenges. It might be expected
that Democratic appointees would show a substantially lower level
of invalidation rates, but the percentage of Democratic votes to invalidate is nearly identical: 20%. No panel effects can be found.
Note in this connection that our investigation did not include the
Court of Claims, where, according to informal lore, ideological divisions are common. 3 It would be valuable to know whether a
study of that court would uncover party and panel effects.
D. Ideological Voting Without Amplification or Dampening: The
Unique Cases of Abortion and CapitalPunishment
It is possible to imagine areas dominated by ideological voting.
In such areas, judges would be expected to vote in a way that reflects the political affiliation of the appointing president-but
panel effects would be minimal. This is the pattern of outcomes in
only two areas that we investigated: abortion and capital punishment (Figure 4).

62Neither

the coefficient for party nor that for panel is significantly different from

zero.
'The

informal lore receives support from Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord,
The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 509 (1998).
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Figure 4. Voting Patterns for Case Types with Only a Party Effect
(M (black) = Republican appointees, 0 (white) = Democratic appointees)
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Democratic appointees cast pro-choice votes 70% of the time,
compared to 49% for Republican appointees. Here again we find
evidence of ideological voting. But panel effects are absent. Sitting
with two Democratic appointees, Republican appointees vote in
favor of invalidation 53% of the time, not appreciably different
from the 48% rate when sitting with one or more Republican appointees and the 50% invalidation rate in all-Republican panels.
Similarly, sitting with two Republican appointees, Democratic appointees vote in favor of abortion rights 68% of the time, not much
less than the 71% and 73% rates when sitting with one or two
other Democratic appointees, respectively. The failure of the third
hypothesis is even more striking. A Republican vote on an allRepublican panel is essentially the same as on a panel of two Republican appointees and one Democrat. A Democratic vote on an
all-Democratic panel is essentially the same as on a panel of two
Democratic appointees and one Republican.
Capital punishment shows a similar pattern: a large party difference but no other significant effects. Republican appointees vote
for defendants 19% of the time on all-Republican panels, 19% of
the time on majority Republican panels, and 24% of the time on
majority Democratic panels. Democratic appointees vote for defendants 37% of the time on all-Democratic panels, 44% of the
time on majority Democratic panels, and 40% of the time on majority Republican panels.
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E. Panel Decisions
Thus far we have focused on the votes of individual judges. For
litigants and the law, of course, it is not the votes of individual
judges, but the decisions of three-judge panels, that are of real interest. Let us now turn to panel outcomes.
In terms of the political affiliation of the appointing president,
there are four possible combinations of judges on a three-judge
panel: RRR, RRD, RDD, and DDD. Variations in panel composition can have two important effects, which should now be distinguished. The first involves the sheer number of people leaning in a
certain direction. Suppose, for example, that Republican appointees are likely to rule in favor of a particular type of program only
40% of the time, whereas Democratic appointees are likely to rule
in favor of such programs 70% of the time. As a simple statistical
matter, and putting to one side the possibility that judges are influenced by one another, it follows that the likely majority outcome of
a panel will be affected by its composition. Under the stated assumption, a panel of all-Democratic appointees is far more likely
(78%) to uphold the program than a panel of two Democratic appointees and one Republican (66%), while an all-Republican panel
would be much less likely to do so (35%). '
This is an important and substantial difference. As noted, however, this statistical effect assumes that judicial votes are not influenced by judicial colleagues. Suppose that an individual judge's
likely vote is in fact influenced by the composition of the panel. If
so, then the mere majority force of predispositions, just described,
will not tell the full story of the difference between all-Republican
panels and all-Democratic panels. In fact, the statistical account
will understate the difference, possibly substantially. To illustrate
with our own data, let us assume for the moment that the average
These figures come from the multinomial probabilities of getting at least two
votes to uphold (a yes vote, "Y"), given the panel composition. For a three-judge
panel, there are four ways to uphold a decision-votes of YYY, YYN, YNY, and
NYY, from judges 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For example, for an all-Democratic appointed panel ("DDD"), the probability of a judgment to uphold the program is
P(YYY) + P(YYN) + P(YNY) + P(NYY) = .7*.7*.7 + .7*.7*(1-.7) + .7*(1-.7)*.7 + (1.7)*.7*.7 = .343 + .147 + .147 + .147 = .784, which rounds to 78%; for one Republican
and two Democrats ("RDD"), the calculation is .4*.7*.7 + .4*.7*(1-.7) + .4*(1-.7)*.7 +
(1-.4)*.7*.7 = .196 + .084 + .084 + .294 = .658; and so forth.
6
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percentages reported in the bottom row of Table 1 do accurately
represent individual voting tendencies for case types that show differences in panel decisions. Figure 5 compares the predicted percentages, based on 34% for Republican appointees and 50% for
Democratic appointees and using the calculation above, to the observed averages from the same row of the Table. The predicted
panel effect (DDD% - RRR%) is 23%, but the observed effect is
35%. It is clear that to explain these results, something must be at
work other than majority voting with different ideological predictions.65
Figure 5. Predicted vs. Actual Panel Decisions
(for case types with a panel difference)
U Predicted Panel
70%

-Actual Panel

600%
50%>40%-

30% -

20%
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Panel Composition

65If

the shape of the graph were to hold up, it would suggest that the largest dispari-

ties occur when Democratic appointees are in the majority. This conclusion is tentative, of course, because of the lack of a clean or simple measure of the "true" party
difference since judges only vote on panels with other judges, and never alone.
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II. DISAGGREGATING BY CIRCUIT

There are twelve federal courts of appeals, and it is therefore
possible to disaggregate the cases by circuit to see whether the effects observed in the aggregate data hold across the board. In some
contexts, the sample is too small to allow for reliable generalizations. To obtain a sense of what is happening across circuits, we aggregated the various cases within circuits.' The simplest finding has
to do with ideological variations across circuits.
Figure 6. Circuit Composition and Individual Voting Patterns
(sorted by percentage of liberal votes)
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66To provide a common basis for comparing the circuits, we analyzed those case
types with party differences, as in Figures 1-4, but also excluded environmental cases,
which were brought only in the D.C. Circuit.
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Consider Figure 6. In accordance with standard lore, the Ninth
and Second Circuits are two of the most liberal, and the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits are two of the most conservative. The rankings, in
terms of ideology, correlate strongly but not perfectly with the percentage of Democratic appointees on the relevant court in 2002
(r = .59).67 Note that the figure, while suggestive, is a bit crude. In
many contexts, litigants have some discretion about the circuit in
which to bring suit, and hence civil rights plaintiffs would prefer to
bring suit in the Ninth Circuit rather than in the Fifth. But broadly
speaking, the figure probably captures ideological differences
across circuits.
Now turn to another question: whether the effects of party and
panel differ across circuits. As before, to obtain a measure of party
effects, we subtract the percentage of liberal votes by Republican
appointees from the percentage of liberal votes by Democratic appointees; this is a good test for whether party predicts likely votes.
To create our measure of panel effects, we subtract the percentage
of liberal votes by judges (whether Republican or Democrat) sitting with two Republican appointees from the percentage of such
votes of judges sitting with two Democratic appointees. Figure 7
presents the results. There are party differences in all circuits, although they do differ in magnitude. The Third, Fifth, and Seventh
Circuits show small party differences (less than 8%), followed by a
group of eight circuits with party differences in the 12%-17%
range, followed by the Ninth Circuit, which shows by far the largest
party difference (27%).
There is also a modest tendency for party differences to be larger as the ideology of the circuit becomes more liberal (a correlation across circuits of .43 between the percentage of liberal votes
and the size of the party difference). Larger party differences tend
to be accompanied by larger panel differences as well. There is a
correlation of .70 between the sizes of party and panel effects (the
Sixth Circuit, which has a large party effect but no panel effect, is
the main exception to this pattern). In the great majority of circuits, therefore, a judge's vote is predicted as well or better by the
67 Of

course, since our cases occurred over many years, an analysis that more care-

fully matched the year of the case with the then-current composition of the relevant
circuit could show a stronger relationship.
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political affiliation of the president who appointed the two other
panel members as by the political affiliation of the president who
appointed the judge in question.
Figure 7. Party and Panel Effects on Individual Judge's Votes, by
Circuit
(from smallest to largest party difference)
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III.

EXPLANATIONS

What explains this pattern of outcomes? We sort them into three
categories: those in which all three hypotheses are rejected; those
in which party effects are clear but unaccompanied by panel effects; and those in which all three hypotheses are confirmed.
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A. No Party Effects, No Panel Effects
Consider first the contexts in which all three of our hypotheses
are rejected. In those contexts, Republican and Democratic appointees do not much disagree, and hence the political party of the
appointing judge will not affect outcomes. In many areas, ideology
is undoubtedly irrelevant to judicial votes. For example, we would
not expect to see significant party effects in diversity cases that present routine issues of state law. Our investigation finds that party is
irrelevant in several areas where such effects might be anticipated,
and indeed in which we anticipated them. By informal lore, Republican appointees and Democratic appointees do disagree in criminal appeals, takings, and federalism cases. But informal lore is
wrong. There are two possible explanations.
The first explanation is that the law (as elaborated by the Supreme Court or by previous appellate decisions) is clear and binding, and hence ideological disagreements cannot materialize. It is
plausible to think that in all three areas, the precedents dampen
any differences between Republican and Democratic appointees.
At the court of appeals level, there might well be a sufficient consensus about the doctrine to overcome the potential effects of
party. Perhaps the disagreements can manifest themselves only in
the "frontier" cases-the highly unusual situations that find their
way to the Supreme Court itself. This hypothesis finds some support in the Commerce Clause area, where the small (but statistically significant) difference between Democratic and Republican
appointees seems to come in these "frontier" cases, despite an
overall high level of agreement.'
The second possibility is that even if the doctrine does allow
courts room to maneuver, appointees of different parties do not
much disagree about the appropriate principles. Other empirical
work suggests that in criminal cases, President Clinton's appointees
do not differ from Republican appointees." A near-consensus appears to exist in this area. Perhaps the same is true in the contexts
of takings and federalism. For criminal appeals, there is a further
point. Unlike in the civil context, criminal defendants will appeal
6'See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
69See

Nancy Scherer, Are Clinton's Judges "Old" Democrats or "New" Democ-

rats?, 84 Judicature 150, 154 (2000).
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even when there is no indeterminacy, because (with very rare exceptions) they are not paying for the appeal. As a result, most
criminal appeals lack merit under the prevailing doctrine.' Our
data do not allow us to decide between the "binding precedent"
and "ideological agreement" accounts, but they do show that in
some domains where Democratic appointees and Republican appointees might be expected to differ, there is essential agreement.
In these contexts, we find a tribute to conventional aspirations for
the rule of law.7
B. Party Effects Without PanelEffects
What about the contexts of abortion and capital punishment?
Here we find that party affiliation is what matters, and hence that
people will vote their convictions regardless of the composition of
the panel. In these cases, antecedent convictions must be extremely
strong-strong enough to undo the group influences that occur in
other types of cases. It seems clear that judges have strong beliefs
about abortion and capital punishment, issues about which beliefs
are often fiercely held. In cases of this kind, it is natural to assume
that votes will be relatively impervious to panel effects. 2
The disaggregated data show that for some judges, other areas
have similar characteristics. On the D.C. Circuit, Democratic appointees respond to industry challenges to environmental regulations in the same way that judges as a whole respond to abortion
and capital punishment cases: They are impervious to the different
influences that come from different panel compositions. For Democratic appointees, party matters, but panel does not. (Interestingly, Republican appointees on the D.C. Circuit show both party
and panel influences.) In general, Sixth Circuit judges show the
same pattern as Democrats on the D.C. Circuit in cases challenging
environmental regulations. How can we explain such patterns?
One possibility is that the relevant judges have strong convictions
across a range of cases, convictions that are sufficient to make

'0Recall that many of the easiest cases are unpublished, but a large number of easy
cases in the criminal domain still find their way into publication.
Along the same lines, see Cross, supra note 3.
72See the discussion of how group influences are weakest in easy cases and when
people have strong convictions, in Sunstein, supra note 9, at 24-26.
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panel irrelevant. Perhaps this is true for Democratic appointees assessing environmental cases on the D.C. Circuit. Another possibility is that judges of the opposing party are particularly unconvincing. To understand this possibility, it is necessary to explore the
reasons for panel effects.
C. Why Aren't the Effects Larger?
We have been emphasizing the existence of strong party and
panel effects. But this is only part of the story. It would be possible
to see our data as suggesting that most of the time, the law is what
matters, not ideology. Note here that even when party effects are
significant, they are not overwhelmingly large. Recall that Republican appointees cast stereotypically liberal votes 38% of the time,
whereas Democratic appointees do so 51% of the time. Half of the
votes of Democratic appointees are stereotypically conservative,
and over one-third of the votes of Republican appointees are
stereotypically liberal. More often than not, Republican and Democratic appointees agree with one another, even in the most controversial cases. Why is this?
We think that the answer has three parts. The first consists of
panel effects. Republican appointees often sit with one or more
Democratic appointees, and the same is true for Democratic appointees. If judges are influenced by one another, the random assignment of judges will inevitably produce some dampening of differences. The second factor involves the disciplining effect of
precedent and law-a factor that might be labeled "professionalism." In the context of Commerce Clause challenges to legislation,
we have explained judicial agreement across party lines partly on
the ground that precedent is seen to dispose of most current disputes. Sometimes precedent will allow some, but not a great deal
of, space for ideological differences to emerge. Undoubtedly the
large measure of agreement is partly a product of the constraints of
law itself. In some areas, those constraints will ensure that Republican and Democratic appointees do not disagree. In other areas,
they will permit disagreement, but they will discipline its magnitude.
The third factor involves legal and political culture. For all of
their differences, Democratic and Republican judicial appointees
are almost never ideologues or extremists. If a sex discrimination

HeinOnline -- 90 Va. L. Rev. 336 2004

2004]

Ideological Voting

337

plaintiff presents a strong claim, Republican appointees will agree
with her, even if the law allows judges to exercise discretion; if industry shows that an environmental regulation is plainly arbitrary,
Democratic appointees will strike it down as arbitrary, even if the
law would allow them to uphold it. The process of legal training
imposes strong limits on what judges seek to do. In any case, the
political culture constrains presidential appointments, ensuring a
kind of filtering that will, for the most part, prevent presidents
from nominating (and the Senate from confirming) people whose
views are perceived as extreme. The high levels of agreement between Republican and Democratic appointees are undoubtedly affected by this fact. The most general point is that insofar as our
evidence shows less in the way of party effects than some people
might expect, professional discipline and legal consensus help explain the level of agreement.
D. Why Panel Effects?
In our data, the usual pattern involves not simply party effects
but also panel effects. Indeed, the latter are as large as the former
and sometimes larger. We observe substantial panel effects in the
areas of campaign finance, affirmative action, disability discrimination, piercing the corporate veil, race discrimination, sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and judicial review of environmental
regulations at the behest of industry plaintiffs. We suggest that
three factors are probably at work.
1. The Collegial Concurrence
In the context of judicial review of environmental regulations,
Dean Revesz's empirical analysis finds that "while individual ideology and panel composition both have important effects on a
judge's vote, the ideology of one's colleagues is a better predictor
of one's vote than one's own ideology."73 We have moderated this
finding and extended it, as moderated, to many domains. But why
is "the ideology of one's colleagues" so influential? Let us begin by
focusing on the difference between how a judge will vote on a
three-judge panel if she sits with no colleagues from the same

" Revesz, supra note 19, at 1764.
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party, and how a judge will vote if she sits with one or more colleagues from the same party. The simplest explanation is that much
of the time, judges are willing to offer a "collegial concurrence."
Two factors are likely to contribute to the collegial concurrence.
First, the votes of one's colleagues carry some information about
what is right. If two colleagues believe that an affirmative action
program is unconstitutional, and no other judge is available to argue on its behalf, then the exchange of arguments in the room will
suggest that the program is genuinely unconstitutional. Second,
dissenting opinions on a three-judge panel are likely to be both futile and burdensome to produce-a difficult combination. Most of
the time, such dissents will not persuade either of the majority's
judges to switch his vote. To be sure, such a dissent might, in extreme cases, attract the attention of the Supreme Court or lead to a
rehearing en banc; and when judges dissent, it is partly in the hope
that such an outcome will occur. Supreme Court review is rare,
however, and courts of appeals do not regularly rehear cases en
banc. In any case, it is time-consuming to write a dissent. If the ultimate decision is not going to be affected, why do the extra work?
There are further points. Our data capture votes rather than
opinions. Perhaps Democratic appointees show a conservative voting pattern when sitting with two Republicans; but perhaps they
are able to affect the opinion, moving it in the direction of greater
moderation. If so, the effect of the isolated judge is understated by
our data; that effect can be measured only by examining opinions
for moderation or extremism (a possibility to which we shall return). In any case, dissenting opinions might also cause a degree of
tension among judges, a particular problem in light of the fact that
the same judges often work together for many years. According to
informal lore, a kind of implicit bargain is struck within many
courts of appeals, in the form of, "I won't dissent from your opinions if you won't dissent from mine, at least not unless the disagreement is very great."
All of these points help account for the great power of "the ideology of one's colleagues" in producing judicial votes. It would be
interesting in this regard to learn whether judges are less likely to
dissent when they are newly appointed or when they have been on
the bench for an extended period-and also whether judges are
less likely to dissent when their chambers are physically close to
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other chambers and hence when judges see each other on a regular
basis.
We can better understand these points if we notice the clear
connection between the collegial concurrence and the behavior of
individuals in experimental settings when faced with a unanimous
group opinion. A great deal of social science research has demonstrated that if people are confronted with the unanimous views of
others, they tend to yield.74 This finding has been made in the context of both political and legal issues,7" and it extends to simple issues of fact.76 Sometimes people yield even with respect to the unambiguous evidence of their own senses. The yielding, a form of
collegial concurrence, occurs partly because of the information
suggested by the unanimity of others; how could shared views be
wrong? And it occurs partly because of reputational pressures;
people do not want to stand out on a limb for fear that others will
disapprove of them. The evidence here suggests that judges are
vulnerable to similar influences.
Note that an understanding of collegial concurrences may help
explain the failure of the second and third hypotheses in the contexts of abortion and capital punishment. In those contexts, judgments are firmly held, and the firmness of those judgments is sufficient to outweigh the informational and reputational pressure
imposed by the contrary judgments of panel members. It may also
be the case that for certain highly charged issues, a given judge's
convictions are well known to be deeply held by the other judges
on that panel, and thus those judges are less likely to perceive a
dissent as a failure of collegiality.
In fact, an understanding of the relevant processes helps to explain and refine the leveling effects that we have emphasized. Suppose that a Democratic appointee is sitting with two Republican
appointees, and everyone on the panel knows that the Democratic
appointee might reject an extreme ruling. A dissent or a separate
opinion may be unlikely; but the mere possibility might lead the
two Republicans to moderate their ruling so as to ensure unanimity. The collegial concurrence need not signify that the isolated
74

See, for example, the overview in Asch, supra note 10.
"' See Richard S.Crutchfield, Conformity and Character, 10 Am. Psychologist 191

(1955).
76See Asch, supra note 10.
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Democrat, or the isolated Republican, is simply going along with
her peers. The very presence of a potential dissenter can lead to a
mutually agreeable opinion; both sides might have done some
yielding. We have emphasized that our data, focused on outcomes,
do not enable us to test this hypothesis rigorously. But the sharp
difference between divided and unified panels, in terms of expected votes, is at least suggestive of the possibly important effect
of the isolated Democrat or Republican. It is to that difference that
we now turn.
2. Group Polarization
Why do all-Republican panels and all-Democratic panels behave
so distinctively? Why are they different from majority Republican
panels and majority Democratic panels? A clue comes from one of
the most striking findings in modern social science: Groups of likeminded people tend to go to extremes." More particularly, such
groups end up adopting a more extreme version of their predeliberation tendencies. Consider a few examples outside of the legal
context:
A group of moderately profeminist women become more
strongly profeminist after discussion.78
After discussion, citizens of France become more critical of the
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid.79
After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in
American cities. 8°
After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice
offer more positive responses to the same question."

77See Brown, supra note 11, at 203-26.
78

See David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Hum. Rel. 699,

707-12
71 See
80See
"ISee

(1975).
Brown, supra note 11, at 224.
id.
id.
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After discussion, juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce awards that are significantly higher than the
awards specified, before discussion, by median member.82
An understanding of group polarization strongly suggests that in
an important sense, our findings about party and panel effects are
understated. We have focused on votes-on who wins and who
loses. We have not focused on opinions, which can be written narrowly or broadly. Investigation of the substance of the opinions
would obviously be burdensome and involve considerable discretion on the part of the investigator. But it is plausible to speculate
that a unified panel is less likely to be moderate than a divided
one-and hence that an investigation that looks only at likely votes
understates the extremism of all-Republican and all-Democratic
panels. Much room remains for further analysis.
There have been three main explanations for group polarization,
all of which have been extensively investigated.83
a. PersuasiveArguments
The first explanation, emphasizing the role of persuasive arguments, is based on a common sense intuition: Any individual's position on an issue is partly a function of which arguments presented
within the group are convincing. People's judgments therefore
move in the direction of the most persuasive position defended by
the group, taken as a collectivity. Because a group whose members
are already inclined to vote in a certain direction will have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that direction, the
result of discussion will be to move people further in the direction
of their initial inclinations. The key is the existence of a limited argument pool, one that is skewed in a particular direction.' In the
context of appellate judging, we think that this is the most compelling explanation of our finding of the relative extremism of allDemocratic and all-Republican tribunals. Judges are busy people,
and they do not always have the time or inclination to produce a
See Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 11, at 1140-41.
3 See Brown, supra note 11, at 212-22; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 120-24; Robert S.
Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J. Experimental Soc.
Psychol. 537 (1996).
' See Brown, supra note 11, at 219-20.
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counterargument on their own. The natural human tendency toward confirmation bias-finding most compelling those arguments
that confirm one's antecedent inclinations 85-reinforces this process. Hence it should be no surprise that like-minded judges go to
extremes.
b. Social Comparison
The second explanation, involving social comparison, begins
with the claim that people want to be perceived favorably by other
group members and that they want also to perceive themselves favorably. Once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position. The result is to
press the group's position toward one or another extreme and also
to induce shifts in individual members.86 People may wish, for example, not to seem too enthusiastic or too restrained in their enthusiasm for affirmative action, feminism, or an increase in national defense; hence their views may shift when they see what
other group members think. The result will be group polarization.
c. The Role of Corroboration
The third explanation begins by noting that people with extreme
views tend to have more confidence that they are right, and that as
people gain confidence they become more extreme in their beliefs.87 The basic idea is simple: Those who lack confidence and who
are unsure what they think tend to moderate their views. It is for
this reason that cautious people, not knowing what to do, are likely
to choose the midpoint between relevant extremes.' If other people seem to share your view, however, you are likely to become
more confident that you are correct-and hence to move in a more
extreme direction. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people's opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply
because their view has been corroborated, and because they have

8

See David Myers, Intuition: Its Powers and Perils 116-19 (2002).

86
87

See Brown, supra note 11, at 215-16; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 122-23.
See Baron et al., supra note 83, at 537-38.

mSee Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J.
Legal Stud. 287, 287-88 (1996).
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become more confident after learning of the shared views of others.89

It seems reasonable to speculate that one of our key resultsideological amplification on all-Republican and all-Democratic
panels-reflects group polarization. When a court consists of a
panel of judges with the same basic orientation, the median view
before deliberation begins will be significantly different from what
it would be in a panel of diverse judges. The argument pool will be
very different as well. For example, a panel of three Republican
appointees, tentatively inclined to invalidate the action of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), will offer a range of arguments in support of invalidation and relatively few in the other
direction--even if the law, properly interpreted, favors validation.
If the panel contains a judge who is inclined to uphold the EPA,
the arguments that favor validation are far more likely to emerge
and to be pressed. Indeed, the very fact that the judge is a Democrat increases the likelihood that such counterarguments will
emerge, since that judge might not think of himself as being part of
the same "group" as the other panel members. Because corroboration of opinion leads to greater confidence, and hence extremity, it
is not surprising that deliberation by a panel of three like-minded
judges would lead to unusual and extreme results.
In this context, the difference in voting patterns on unified and
divided panels is fortified by the possibility that the minority judge,
finding himself outnumbered, might produce a dissenting opinion
in public. To be sure, Supreme Court review is rare, and, in the
general run of cases, the prospect of such review probably does not
have much of a deterrent effect on courts of appeals. But judges
who write majority opinions are usually not enthusiastic about having to see and respond to dissenting opinions. If the law actually
favors the dissenting view, two judges, even if they would like to
reverse the EPA, might be influenced to adopt the easier course of
validation.
At this point a skeptic might note that lawyers make adversarial
presentations before judges. Such a skeptic might insist that the
size of the "argument pool" is determined by those presentations,
not only-and not even mostly-by what members of the panel are
' See Baron et al., supra note 83, at 559.
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inclined to say and do. And undoubtedly the inclinations of judges
are shaped, some of the time, by the contributions of advocates.
But adversarial presentations are made before all possible panel
compositions, and hence they cannot explain panel effects that we
have observed. What matters for purposes of the outcomes is the
inclinations of judges. It is because of these inclinations that the existence of a unified rather than divided panel can make all the difference. Notice in this regard that for the polarization hypothesis to
hold, it is not necessary to know whether judges spend a great deal
of time offering reasons to one another. Mere exposure to a conclusion is enough.' A system of simple votes unaccompanied by
reasons should incline judges to polarize. Of course reasons, if they
are good ones, are likely to make those votes especially persuasive.
3. The Whistleblower Effect
Imagine that existing law is not entirely clear, but that fairly applied, it requires one or another outcome. It is easily imaginable
that like-minded judges, unaccompanied by a potential dissenter,
will fail to apply the law fairly. This is not because they are essentially lawless. It is because when the law is unclear, fallible human
beings might well be inclined to understand the law in a way that
fits with their predilections.
These points provide a possible explanation for some of the differences between panels with two-to-one majorities and panels in
which all judges were appointed by a president of the same political party. Consider affirmative action cases. In some of these cases,
three Democratic appointees might well be inclined to vote in favor of validation even if existing doctrine argues the other way. If
no Republican appointee is on the panel, there is a risk that the
panel will unanimously support validation despite existing law. The
effect of the Republican is to call the panel's attention to the tension between its inclination and the decided cases. Of course, her
effort may fail. Her co-panelists might persist in their views, perhaps with the claim that those cases can be distinguished. But when
existing law does create serious problems for the panel, the presence of a judge with a different inclination will have a large effect.
We speculate that in the areas in which there is a large difference
90See Baron et al., supra note 14, at 74.
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between two-to-one majorities and three judges from the same
party, this effect-the whistleblower effect-is playing a role.9"
Our data do not allow this speculation to be tested directly, but a
separate study shows the importance of a potential dissenter, or
whistleblower, in ensuring that courts follow the law.' More particularly, a Democratic appointee on a majority Republican court
of appeals panel turns out to be extremely important in ensuring
that such a panel does what the law asks it to do. The basic point is
that diversity of view can help to correct errors-not that judges of
one or another party are more likely to be correct.
To understand this study, some background is in order. Under
the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, courts should uphold agency interpretations of law so long as the interpretations do not clearly violate
congressional instructions and are "reasonable."93 But when do
courts actually uphold such interpretations? Existing law allows
judges considerable room to maneuver, so that courts inclined to
invalidate agency interpretations usually can find a plausible basis
for doing so. The real question is when they will claim to have
found that plausible basis. The relevant study, extending well beyond environmental protection to regulation in general, confirms
the idea that party affiliation has an exceedingly large influence on
outcomes within the D.C. Circuit. If observers were to code cases
very crudely by taking account of whether industry or a public interest group is bringing the challenge, they would find that a panel
with a majority of Republican appointees reaches a conservative
judgment 54% of the time, whereas a panel with a majority of Democratic appointees reaches such a judgment merely 32% of the
time .

91Insofar as the governing precedent was produced by another court of appeals, it
might be a product of an all-Republican or an all-Democratic panel, producing a form
of path dependency. Many complications are created by the possibility that an isolated judge would blow the whistle by asking a panel to conform to the beliefs of an
earlier panel with a different and distinctive ideological composition. We are emphasizing here cases in which the precedent was produced by the Supreme Court, not a
lower court.
92Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 2156.
" 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
' Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 2169.
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For present purposes, the most important finding is the dramatic
difference between politically diverse panels, with judges appointed by presidents of more than one party, and politically unified panels, with judges appointed by presidents of only one party.
On divided panels in which a Republican majority of the court
might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court nonetheless upholds the agency's interpretation 62% of the time. But on
unified all-Republican panels, which might be expected to be hostile to the agency, the court upholds the agency's interpretation
only 33% of the time. Note that this was the only unusual finding
in the data. When Democratic majority courts are expected to uphold the agency's decision on political grounds, they do so over
70% of the time, whether unified (71% of the time) or divided
(84% of the time). Consider the results in tabular form:9

Invalidate
agency
action

RRR
panel

RRD
panel

RDD
panel

DDD
panel

67%

38%

16%

29%

It is reasonable to speculate that the only seemingly bizarre result-a 67% invalidation rate when Republican appointees are unified!-reflects group influences and, in particular, group polarization. A group of all-Republican appointees might well take the
relatively unusual step of rejecting an agency's interpretation. By
contrast, a divided panel, with a built-in check on any tendency toward the unusual or extreme outcome, is more likely to take the
conventional route of simply upholding the agency's action. An
important reason is that the single Democratic appointee acts as a
"whistleblower," discouraging the other judges from making a decision that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's command that
courts of appeals should uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.9

Constructed on the basis of data in Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 2171-73.
See id. at 2174-76.
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E. A PreliminaryInvestigation-andFuture Directions
We have emphasized that this is a preliminary investigation. It
should be possible before terribly long to do what we have done
here for multiple domains of the law, extending over time. 97 The
data are readily available, and most of the work involves mere
counting. As we have suggested, it would be exceedingly interesting to know whether the three hypotheses hold in the pre-New
Deal era of tensions between courts and the regulatory state, and
also in the struggle over school segregation. So, too, it would be
valuable to know whether similar patterns can be found in the legal
disputes over slavery, in judicial review of decisions by the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Communications
Commission, in cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and in cases involving foreign affairs and war.
We could easily imagine that ideological disagreements between
judges appointed by presidents of different parties would be
greater or weaker in certain historical periods. 9' It might be hypothesized, for example, that such disagreements were weakened
in the 1940s, when the nation seemed to form a consensus against
an aggressive role for the federal judiciary. It might also be hypothesized that such disagreements would be especially strong
since 1980, with powerful partisan divisions about the appropriate
role of the federal judiciary. 99 Are these hypotheses correct? Ultimately, it would be desirable to compile an extensive data set
about votes on federal courts of appeals, showing the diverse patterns into which those votes fall.
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

It remains to investigate the normative issues. Is it troubling to
find a large effect from party or panel composition? Should we be
concerned if like-minded judges go to extremes? Is there reason to
attempt to ensure diversity on the federal courts, or to promote a
97

We are attempting many extensions of this preliminary analysis in the Chicago
Judges Project, at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/policy/judges/ (2004).
98For supportive evidence, see Cross, supra note 3, at 1506--08 (finding that ReaganBush judges are the most ideological since the late 1940s and that Carter judges are
the least ideological).
99See id. for strong support.
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degree of diversity on panels? There is a widespread view that
judges appointed by presidents of different political parties are not
fundamentally different and that, once on the bench, judges frequently surprise those who nominated them. The view is not entirely baseless, but it is misleading. Some appointees do disappoint
the presidents who nominated them, but those examples are not
typical. Judges appointed by Republican presidents are quite different from judges appointed by Democratic presidents. To take
evidence from just one area, "[p]artisanship clearly affects how appellate courts review agency discretion.""' We have acknowledged
that the effects that we find are large but not massive. Because of
the disciplining effect of precedent, and because judges do not
radically disagree with one another, there is significant commonality across political parties. But in the most difficult areas, the ones
where the law is unclear or in flux, both party and panel effects are
large enough to be a source of serious concern.
It is difficult to evaluate the underlying issues without taking a
stand on the merits-without knowing what we want judges to do.
Suppose that three Republican appointees are especially likely to
strike down affirmative action programs and that three Democratic
appointees are especially likely to uphold those programs. At first
glance, one or the other inclination is troubling only if we know
whether we disapprove of one or another set of results. And if a
view about what judges should do is the only possible basis for
evaluation, we might conclude that those who prefer judges of a
particular party should seek judges of that party and that group influences are essentially beside the point.
But this conclusion is too strong. In some cases, the law, properly
interpreted, does point toward one or another view. The existence
of diversity on a panel is likely to bring that fact to light and perhaps to move the panel's decision in the direction of what the law
requires. The existence of politically diverse judges and a potential
dissent increases the probability that the law will be followed. The
Chevron study, referred to above, strongly supports this point."°'
The presence of a potential dissenter-in the form of a judge appointed by a president from another political party-creates a pos-

'0

Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 2175.
See id. at 2175-76.
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sible whistleblower who can reduce the likelihood of an incorrect
or lawless decision." Through an appreciation of the nature of
group influences, we can see the wisdom in an old idea: A decision
is more likely to be right, and less likely to be political in a pejorative sense, if it is supported by judges with different predilections.
There is a further point. Suppose that in many areas it is not
clear in advance whether the appointees of Democratic or Republican presidents are correct. Suppose that we are genuinely uncertain. If so, then there is reason to favor a situation in which the legal system has diverse judges, simply on the ground that through
that route, more reasonable opinions are likely to be heard. If we
are genuinely uncertain, then there is reason to favor a mix of
views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face of uncertainty, many people choose between the poles. 3
Consider an analogy. Independent regulatory commissions, such
as the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal
Communications Commission, often make modern law and policy.
Much of the time, such agencies act through adjudication. They
function in the same fashion as federal courts. Under federal statutes, Congress has attempted to ensure that these agencies are not
monopolized by either Democratic appointees or Republican appointees. The law requires that no more than a bare majority of
agency members may be from a single party."
An understanding of group influences helps to justify this requirement. An independent agency that is all-Democratic or allRepublican might move toward an extreme position-indeed, toward a position that is more extreme than that of the median Democrat or Republican, and possibly more extreme than that of any
agency official standing alone. A requirement of bipartisan membership can operate as a check against movements of this kind.
Congress was apparently aware of this general point. Closely attuned to the policymaking functions of the relevant institutions,
,2 This is the explanation in Cross & Tiller, supra note 12, at 2173.
103See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in Behavioral Law and Economics 61, 61 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
'0,See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) (stating that the SEC shall be composed of
five commissioners appointed by the president, not more than three of whom shall be
members of the same political party).
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Congress was careful to provide a safeguard against extreme
movements.
Why do we fail to create similar safeguards for courts? Part of
the answer must lie in a belief that, unlike heads of independent
regulatory commissions, judges are not policymakers. Their duty is
to follow the law, not to make policy. An attempt to ensure bipartisan composition would seem inconsistent with a commitment to
this belief. But the evidence we have discussed shows that judges
are policymakers of an important kind and that, in some contexts,
their political commitments very much influence their votes. In
principle, there is good reason to attempt to ensure a mix of perspectives within courts of appeals.
Of course the idea of diversity, or of a mix of perspectives, is
hardly self-defining. It would not be appropriate to say that the
federal judiciary should include people who refuse to obey the
Constitution, or who refuse to exercise the power of judicial review, or who think that the Constitution allows suppression of political dissent and does not forbid racial segregation. Here, as elsewhere, the domain of appropriate diversity is limited. What is
necessary is reasonable diversity, or diversity of reasonable views,
and not diversity as such. People can certainly disagree about what
reasonable diversity entails in this context. We are suggesting here
that there is such a thing as reasonable diversity and that it is important to ensure that judges, no less than anyone else, are exposed
to it, and not merely through the arguments of advocates.
A competing argument would stress a possible purpose of the
lower federal courts: to produce a wide range of positions, so that
Supreme Court review will ultimately follow an exploration of a
number of possible interpretations. For those who emphasize the
value of diverse decisions, what we have treated as a vice might instead be a virtue. On this view, it is desirable to have unified panels
of ideologically similar judges, simply in order to produce a wide
band of arguments for the Supreme Court to assess. We do not believe that this is an irrelevant concern; it weighs in the balance.
More (reasonable) positions are better than fewer. We would respond only that Supreme Court review is exceedingly rare and that
most of the time, court of appeals decisions are effectively final. In
these circumstances, it is not clear that the gain in the range of
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ideas outweighs the competing considerations to which we have
pointed.
These points cast fresh light on a much disputed issue: the legitimate role of the Senate in giving "advice and consent" to presidential appointments to the federal judiciary. Above all, an understanding of social influences supports the view that the Senate has
a responsibility to exercise its constitutional authority in order to
ensure a reasonable diversity of views. The history of the Constitution strongly suggests an independent role for the Senate in consenting to the appointment of federal judges. 5 That independent
role certainly authorizes the Senate to consider the general approach and the likely pattern of votes of potential judges. There
can be no doubt that the president considers the general approach
of his nominees; the Senate is entitled to do the same. Under good
conditions, these simultaneous powers would bring about a healthy
form of checks and balances, permitting each branch to counter the
other. Indeed, that system is part and parcel of social deliberation
about the direction of the federal judiciary.
Why might this view be rejected? It could be urged that there is
only one legitimate approach to constitutional or statutory interpretation-that, for example, some version of originalism or textualism is the only such approach, and that anyone who rejects that
view is unreasonable. For true believers, it is pointless to argue for
diverse views."° Diversity is not necessary or even valuable if we already know what should be done and if competing views would
simply cloud the issue. In a scientific dispute, it is not helpful to include those who believe that the earth is flat. Alternatively, it
might be urged that a deferential role for the Senate, combined
with natural political competition and cycles, will produce a sensible mix over time. We do not deny this possibility. Nor have we
dismissed the suggestion that unified panels have some real advantages. Our only suggestions are that a high degree of diversity on
" David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491, 1494 (1992).
'06 Note, however, that even if it would be appropriate for all judges to share a certain approach, it is also desirable to have diversity with respect to the application of
that approach. Textualists do not all agree with one another; there is internal diversity
in the world of originalism. Diversity is appropriate here to ensure an airing of reasonable views.
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the federal judiciary is desirable, that the Senate is entitled to pursue diversity, and that without such diversity, judicial panels will
inevitably go in unjustified directions.
CONCLUSION

No reasonable person seriously doubts that ideology, understood as normative commitments of various sorts, helps to explain
judicial votes. Presidents are entirely aware of this point, and their
appointment decisions are undertaken with full appreciation of it. 107
We have found striking evidence of a relationship between the political party of the appointing president and judicial voting patterns. We have also found that much of the time, judicial votes are
affected by panel composition. In many domains, the voting patterns of isolated Democratic appointees are close to what would be
expected from the median Republican appointee, just as the voting
patterns of an isolated Republican appointee are akin to what
would be expected from the median Democratic appointee. In
many domains, a Democratic appointee is significantly more likely
to vote in the stereotypical liberal fashion if surrounded by two
Democratic appointees than if surrounded by one Republican and
one Democrat. Similarly, the voting patterns of Republican appointees are very much influenced by having two, rather than one,
co-panelists appointed by a president of the same political party.
Taken as a whole, the data suggest the pervasiveness of three
phenomena. The first is the collegial concurrence: votes to join two
colleagues and to refuse to dissent publicly, notwithstanding an initial disposition to vote the other way and possibly a continuing belief that the decision is incorrect. The second is group polarization:
the tendency of a group of like-minded people to move to relative
extremes. The third is a whistleblower effect, by which a single
judge of a different party from the majority can have a moderating
effect on a judicial panel.
It might be surprising to find that in some controversial areas,
the political affiliation of the appointing president is not correlated
with judicial votes, and hence that in those areas, none of these effects can be observed. This is the basic finding for criminal appeals,
takings, and federalism. But it should not be terribly shocking to
'0'On practices over time, see Scherer, supra note 4.
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see that in the areas of abortion and capital punishment, judges
vote their convictions. Here the political affiliation of the appointing president is crucial, but panel composition is irrelevant. What is
perhaps most striking is that in our data set, abortion and capital
punishment are the only areas in which ideology matters but panel
composition does not.
These findings do not have clear implications for the composition of panels or for the judiciary as a whole. But if divided panels
increase the likelihood of effective whistleblowing, and if unified
panels tend to go to extremes, there is fresh reason to attempt to
ensure a high degree of intellectual diversity within the federal
courts and even within judicial panels. Of course this claim would
not hold if the appointees of one or another party had a monopoly
on legal wisdom. In most areas, however, we think that there is no
such monopoly, and that better results are likely to come from a
mix of views and inclinations. However the normative issues are
resolved, the empirical findings are clear. In many domains, Republican appointees vote very differently from Democratic appointees, and the effects of ideology are both dampened and amplified by the composition of the panel.
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APPENDIX: OVERALL LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS

DV = Liberal vote (0,1)
Predictor

Coefficient

Std. Error

z

P>Iz

Party (1 = Democratic appointee)

.576

.074

7.81

.000

Other Two (# Democrat appointees)

.285

.046

6.19

.000

Party * Other Two

.126

.068

1.86

.063

-1.144

.110

-10.41

.000

Abortion

-.028

.155

-.18

.859

Campaign Finance

-.997

.194

-5.13

.000

Capital Punishment

-1.226

.139

-8.82

.000

Contracts

-1.517

.184

-8.24

.000

Pierce Corp Veil

ADA

-1.176

.159

-7.40

.000

Environmental protection

-.065

.198

-.33

.743

Sex Discrimination

-.656

.106

-6.21

.000

Title VII

-.799

.120

-6.66

.000

1st Circuit

-.347

.121

-2.87

.004

2nd Circuit

-.321

.112

-2.87

.004

3rd Circuit

.262

.132

1.98

.047

4th Circuit

-.638

.126

-5.06

.000

5th Circuit

-.928

.113

-8.21

.000

6th Circuit

-.584

.111

-5.28

.000

7th Circuit

-.695

.101

-6.89

.000

8th Circuit

-.567

.099

-5.74

.000

10th Circuit
I Ith Circuit

-.472
-.590

.118
.117

-4.01
-5.06

.000
.000

12th Circuit

-.636

.167

-3.80

.000

.331

.131

2.53

.011

Constant
Base case (constant)
Number of obs

=

LR chi2(23)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

=

9th circuit, affirmative action cases, Republican
8475

747.63
-

0.0000
0.0657

Log likelihood = -5318.8336
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